

S H A L L T H E U N I T E D S T A T E S
I N T E R V E N E I N C U B A ?

By H E R B E R T J . S P I N D E N

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PATRIMONIO
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OFICINA DEL HISTORIADOR
DE LA HABANA

SHALL THE UNITED STATES INTERVENE IN CUBA?

A Corrupt Election.—Revolution or Intervention in Prospect

By HERBERT J. SPINDEN

THE United States is confronted with the question whether or not it shall again intervene in Cuba. This question is raised now because in the election held on November 1, 1920, it is so generally believed that Dr. Alfredo Zayas, the candidate of the League, a coalition about 90 per cent. Conservative, won by fraud. Cubans are not gaining faith in the possibility of changing from one administration to another by the constitutional method of an election and are feeling more confirmed in the necessity of reverting to revolution as a method of changing the party in power.

The Cuban people have held six elections since they were freed from Spain. Two of these were held under American supervision, and these two were fair elections quietly held. One of the four elections held under purely Cuban auspices was accepted as a fair election. The other three were not so accepted. A revolution followed one which necessitated American intervention. An unsuccessful revolution (in 1917) followed another and at present a revolution is not an improbable consequence of the third. The record of the


Cuban people on this prime requisite of self-government—the ability to hold an honest election and abide by its results—is 75 per cent. bad. Self-government in Cuba has not shown that the Cubans have the political ability to hold elections instead of revolutions. As I shall show by documents and incidents, there

is cause for revolution in Cuba now, a possibility that it will occur, and a moral obligation on the United States to prevent chaos.

By the terms of the Platt Amendment, incorporated in the Cuban constitution, Cuba bound itself to continue, among other things, the sanitary administration begun under the American occupation and agreed to the right of the United States to intervene. The provision was as follows:

That the Government of Cuba consents that the United States may exercise the right to intervene for the protection of Cuban independence, the maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, property, and individual liberty, and for discharging the obligations with respect to Cuba imposed by the treaty of Paris on the United States, now to be assumed and undertaken by the Government of Cuba.

Under this provi-



CONCERNING AN AMERICAN OBSERVER

A letter from an army officer to President Menocal reporting in response to secret instructions he had received from the President on what to do for one of the American observers to whom the President had publicly promised all facilities for the discharge of his task. The translation of the part of the letter shown above follows:

Pinar del Rio 15 11-20.

TO THE HONORABLE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC, MAJOR-GENERAL MARIO G. MENOCAL, Havana

MY MOST ESTEEMED AND RESPECTED GENERAL:

Complying with your order received by coded telegram of yesterday, 11 P. M. I inform you as follows:

The American Grover Theis came to this town for the first time on the 20th ultimo, stopping at the El Globo Hotel, where he remained 3 days, and paid his bill in cash. This time I did not see him.

He returned on the 20th [30th?] ultimo, lodging at the El Globo Hotel with his wife, remaining at said hotel 6 days. On this occasion he came to see me, handing me the enclosed card from an employee of the Legation, Andrew Degraux, and on the 4th I informed him that he should leave this Province on the train of the 5th at 7 A. M. where was Manuel Landa Potte of the Court of this Province.

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OFICINA DEL HISTORIADOR DE LA HABANA



AMERICAN SAILORS IN HAVANA IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE WAR WITH SPAIN
 During the occupation (1899-1902) the American armed forces were few in numbers; during the intervention of 1906 there was only a nominal force; and if intervention should come again it would not need military force

sion, if there occurs a breakdown in constitutional government, the United States is in duty bound to intervene. Added to this general obligation is another more specific.

The Liberal Party leaders at the end of August voted to withdraw from the elections, being convinced that they would not be given a fair deal. This was, of course, an act of coercion on their part, since such a decision was notice that they would start a revolution unless guarantees of fair dealing, which they believed in, were forthcoming. In this crisis President Menocal was prevailed upon to issue a manifesto declaring that the election would be free and honorable. To make this declaration more effective the American Legation issued a note on August 30, 1920, stating that, while the United States Government did not join either party, it did favor a legal election held under the safeguards of the electoral law freshly prepared by the Cubans. Notice was also given in this note that the United States Government, while it would not undertake to supervise, would have its own observers located in the different provinces of Cuba, from whom impartial accounts could be secured.


Now, if under these conditions an election has been stolen and a revolution threatens in consequence, the moral obligation of the United States is particularly pointed.

The Cuban elections were held on November 1, 1920, one day before those of the United States, and while official returns indicate that Dr. Alfredo Zayas, the candidate of the National League (chiefly Conservative), won over the Liberals by a narrow margin in five out of six provinces, yet the courts throughout the island are jammed with legal cases protesting the count of votes in entire municipalities. There are also numerous criminal cases dealing with infractions of the electoral law by members of the army who should have preserved order.

As a result of the disturbed condition, General Crowder was sent to Cuba by President Wilson on January 3rd under instructions to make a special study of the situation in all its aspects and to confer with President Menocal regarding the remedies to be applied. General Crowder was active in framing the new electoral law of Cuba and in organizing the census of 1919, and, therefore, has a real and deep

GENERALS LEONARD WOOD
AND TASKER BLISS

during the American occupation
(1899-1902) under General Wood
the Cuban Government was or-
ganized, the sanitation and
finances of the island cleaned up,
and roads built which are still the
best in the country



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GEN. ENOCH H. CROWDER
Recently sent to Cuba by President
Wilson to investigate political
conditions there. From 1906 to
1908 he was Secretary of State and
Justice of Cuba under the provi-
sional government set up at that
time by the United States as a
result of a revolution, and in 1919
was invited by the Cuban Govern-
ment to confer with them in refer-
ence to changes in the election laws
of the country. Thus, General
Crowder directed the preparation
of the present election laws

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DE LA HABANA

AMERICA'S OFFICIAL
DEPARTURE FROM CUBA

The U. S. S. *New York* leaving Havana in 1902 with General Wood on board. Cubans still look back upon that American occupation as the model administration of the island. The fact that the Governor-General left "with no more trunks than he came with" made a great impression of American honesty

Photos © Underwood & Underwood



GENERAL WOOD RETIRING
AS GOVERNOR-GENERAL


On May 2, 1902, General Wood formally transferred control of Cuba to President Palma (the third man to the left of General Wood). Since that time there have been four elections, the first resulting in a revolution that necessitated intervention, the second without a revolution, the third resulting in a revolution that failed, and the recent one at present contested and with the germs of revolution in the contests



interest in this mission. It was his hope that the grave abuses of previous elections could be avoided by a law blocking the old evil practices and by a freshly certified register of voters. But the paper barrier proved no protection to the Cuban people against the active leaders fighting for the spoils of office, and it remains to be seen whether a stimulation of legal action will accomplish permanent good.

The fact that nearly every type of evil in the Cuban elections can be matched in some city in the United States should make us lenient in our judgments. At least it should make us realize that the political morality of a social group can not be applied as a personal reproach to the individual members of that group. Cubans have many admirable qualities, but the ability to operate the kind of self-government which Americans have evolved as suited to themselves and which we passed on to the Cubans, is not one of the virtues. At least so the record seems to show.

This article is written in the belief that the light of truth is the best disinfectant. It is not written in the interest of any political party, because the writer understands well enough that the principal difference between the political parties in Cuba is merely opportunity. The party that happens to be in power is naturally able to commit more and greater abuses than the party out of power. There are neither platforms nor principles at the bottom of Cuban political organizations, and but little difference in the character of the followers. It is true that the Conservative Party probably comprises a larger proportion of men of wealth and ability than does the



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
GEN. MARIO G. MENOCAL

President of Cuba whose term expires May 20, 1921. A graduate of Cornell and a successful man he was looked upon as Cuba's best hope. He was first elected in 1912 on the Conservative ticket as a protest against the corruption of the administration of José Miguel Gomez in the only uncontested election held in Cuba under Cuban auspices. He was reelected in 1916 over Dr. Zayas, the Liberal candidate, but there was grave suspicion of the honesty of the election which was followed by the unsuccessful revolution of 1917. He is implicated in the charges of corruption and intimidation in the recent election

Liberal Party, while the latter appeals somewhat more strongly to the laborers. The majority of prominent political leaders have identified themselves first with one organization and then with the other. For instance, Dr. Alfredo Zayas, the candidate of the national League (the makeshift party which is mostly Conservative), was in 1916 the official candidate of the Liberals, while Gen. José Miguel Gomez, the present candidate of that group, was originally a Conservative. Gomez served one term as a Liberal President of Cuba, from 1908 to 1912, with Zayas as his running mate.

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OFICINA DEL HISTORIADOR
DE LA HABANA



GENERAL JOSÉ MIGUEL GÓMEZ

President of Cuba 1907-1911, and Liberal candidate in the recent election. His party, having reason to fear an unfair election, decided in August to abstain from voting, an act generally accepted as notice of a coming revolution. However, in response to the American note of August 30th, the Liberals went to the polls. But the indications of an unfair election are such as to still give the Liberals grounds for their intention to revolt




DR. ALFREDO ZAYAS

The candidate of the League in the recent elections whom the records show as elected. In 1910 and 1916 he was the Liberal candidate. In 1920 he broke with the Liberal Party and formed the Popular Party which joined with the Conservative Party to form "the League." He is, however, threatened with a revolution by Gomez against his presidency whereas four years ago when Zayas was a Liberal Gomez led a revolution in favor of his presidency

Although he inherited the organization of the American Intervention installed by Governor Magoon, it cannot truthfully be said that his administration was a credit to Cuba. To illustrate still further the topsyturvy character of Cuban politics, Gen. Emilio Nuñez, who is now associated with the Liberal Gomez, is actually vice-president to the Conservative Menocal.

And now for the story of the election which has brought on



A MILITARY PASS ISSUED ON ELECTION DAY to a mother whose child was ill. That passes from the military were necessary to allow citizens to move about in certain places on that date is evidence of military intimidation

this crisis in Cuban affairs.

When Lord Bryce wrote his report on the German atrocities in Belgium, he carefully excluded all cases where it did not appear that the deeds complained of were the result of orders. Similarly, as regards intimidations and other abuses that occurred during the period of the Cuban elections, we can afford to leave out of consideration all cases of merely personal or local quarrels and

ADOLFO NUÑEZ
 PRESIDENTE DE LA CÁMARA
 PEDRO DE DE LA CUESTA
 ALCALDE

DRES. NUÑEZ Y CUESTA
 HABANA

Habana Septiembre 13 de 1920.

Al Mayor General Mario G. Menocal,
 Presidente de la República.
 Ciudad.

Mi querido Presidente:

Acabo de regresar de Santo Domingo, en donde se está haciendo una campaña violenta a fin de derrotar en dicho Territorio Municipal a Tiburón y sus huestes; quiero ponerle a Ud. en antecedentes de algo que ocurre allí y es muy importante resolver cuanto antes, a saber: el traslado del Capitán Villa y sustituirlo por uno que sea de los incondicionales.

Trasladar al Sargento Montegudo para el puesto de Rodrigo, a fin de poder neutralizar a Troadio Perez, que se ha ido con José Miguel. Dicho Sargento se encuentra en Santa Clara, y es muy conocido de Rodrigo, en donde es muy querido y está bien relacionado.

El traslado del Cabo Valladares a Mordazo, pues dicho Cabo que se encuentra en Santa Clara, hace mucha falta en Mordazo.

El Alcalde Municipal y la Policía Municipal de Santo Domingo, que son todos de filiación conservadora, no hacen nada en favor de nuestro Partido, ni se prestan tiempo a hacer campaña, por impedirnos al citado Alcalde; y como dicho Ayuntamiento, anda bastante mal, bastaría para lograr nuestros propósitos, una llamada al orden al dicho Alcalde.

ADOLFO NUÑEZ
 PRESIDENTE DE LA CÁMARA
 PEDRO DE DE LA CUESTA
 ALCALDE

DRES. NUÑEZ Y CUESTA
 HABANA

Perdoname que insista sobre el indulto de José de Jesús Fundora, pues es para nosotros en el Territorio de Santo Domingo, un verdadero éxito llevar indultado a dicho Fundora, al cual yo propongo llevar a Santo Domingo, personalmente, tan pronto Ud. lo resuelva, cosa que espero se será brevemente, y me he comprometido con sus familiares, amigos y correligionarios, que son muchos y de verdadera importancia en aquel Territorio, llevarle prontamente.

Con ruego de que no desatienda las apelaciones que le hago es saberme suyo incondicionalmente amigo.

Adolfo Nuñez

A LETTER OF A CUBAN BOSS TO PRESIDENT MENOCAL

In this letter, a translation of which follows, Adolfo Nuñez, a representative in congress and the boss of the town of Santo Domingo asks the President of the Republic to transfer three soldiers in order that they might influence the election by military force, to call a mayor to order because he refused to influence the election, and to pardon a criminal in order to get the votes of his "family, friends, and fellow party members." The soldiers were actually transferred in accordance with this letter and the criminal Fundora was pardoned by President Menocal in a decree published Oct. 1st, over the refusal of the court to recommend the pardon

Havana, September 13th, 1920.

To MAJOR GENERAL MARIO G. MENOCAL
 President of the Republic
 City.

MY DEAR PRESIDENT:

I have just returned from Santo Domingo where a violent campaign is being waged to defeat Tiburón and his forces: I wish to put you on your guard against anything that may happen there and it is very important to decide immediately, namely: the transfer of Captain Villa and his substitution by one that is of the "unconditionals."

To transfer Sergeant Montegudo to the Post of Rodrigo in order to counteract Troadio Perez, who has ranged himself with José Miguel. Said sergeant is in Santa Clara and is very well acquainted with Rodrigo where he is much liked and well connected.

The transfer of Corporal Valladares to Mordazo, since said Corporal, who is in Santa Clara, is absolutely necessary in Mordazo.

The Municipal Mayor and the Municipal Police of Santo Domingo, who are all Conservatives, are doing nothing in favor of our party, nor do they offer to campaign—the said mayor hindering them; and as said Municipal Government is in a bad state, it would suffice, in order to attain our object, to call said Mayor to order.

Pardon me for insisting upon the pardon of José de Jesús Fundora since it is for us in the district of Santo Domingo a real accomplishment to get pardoned the said Fundora, whom I propose to convey to Santo Domingo personally, as soon as you decide, which I hope will be shortly, as I have promised his family, friends, and fellow party members—who are many and of great importance in that district—to bring him soon.

Praying that you will not disregard the appeals I have made to you and always your unconditional friend

(signed) ADOLFO NUÑEZ.

examine only those where the trail leads to high officers of the Government or of the political parties. Indeed, we may even go so far as to waive all strictly party activities, and rest a case against the fairness and legality of the elections upon the evidence of a governmental conspiracy. By a governmental conspiracy is not meant a mere political activity of office-holders fighting for reëlection. What is meant by this phrase is a collusion among the highest officers of the state including the President, various members of his cabinet, and certain congressmen, etc., to defeat the popular will through the deliberate abuse of their governmental powers.

Also, it would not be fair to be too critical if the evils of the Cuban elections in 1920 were the result of momentary passions. The question is, was there a cynical conspiracy against public morality, developed over a period of several months and participated in by the highest authorities? Were the instigators men holding such high offices in the state as practically to be above effective correction and punishment in courts of justice? Did the men in power use the machinery of government not to govern but to reëlect themselves to office?

The record shows that they did. And as long as the men in office do this, the men out of office have but one method of get-



WRECKED TO GET RID OF A LIBERAL MAJORITY

In this voting place in one of the *barrios* (wards) of Colon, Matanzas Province, Sergeant Garcia burned the returns after the Liberals were seen to have a majority

ting in—namely, by revolution.

The plan of the governmental conspiracy against the exercise of suffrage took the following lines of action:

First, the consolidation under one administration of all the forces of public order through putting the portfolio of War and Marine in the hands of the Secretary of the Interior.

Second, the appointment of military supervisors, who are in reality agents of the Secretary of the Interior, to take over the police control of all municipalities in which the Liberal Party was strong.



SERGEANT GARCIA

(seated at the left) who wrecked the electoral college (voting place) shown above

Third, the manipulation of the army for political purposes.

Fourth, the pardoning of criminals to be used mostly as secret agents of intimidation. This abuse began in March, about the time that the Conservatives and their allies put through the amendment to the electoral code of General Crowder permitting fusions between political parties.

Fifth, the appeal to passions by encouraging barbarous exhibitions of African dances.

Each line of action in this plan was followed into minute details of cunningly

thought-out stratagems. There was nothing accidental or incidental in its development; there was nothing hurried or haphazard about it, for it was planned in the winter and it moved forth smoothly toward florescence and fruition across the spring and summer months and into the autumn.

The following letter will serve as a momentary flashlight of a somewhat startling nature on the way in which these different devices were used in the recent election.

Havana, September 13th, 1920.

TO MAJOR GENERAL MARIO G. MENOCA
President of the Republic
City.

MY DEAR PRESIDENT:

I have just returned from Santo Domingo where a violent campaign is being waged to defeat Tiburon and his forces; I wish to put you on your guard against anything that may happen there and it is very important to decide immediately, namely: the transfer of Captain Villa and his substitution by one that is of the "unconditionals."

To transfer Sergeant Monteagudo to the post of Rodrigo in order to counteract Troadio Perez, who has ranged himself with José Miguel. Said sergeant is in Santa Clara and is very well acquainted in Rodrigo where he is much liked and well connected.

The transfer of Corporal Valladares to Mordazo, since said corporal, who is in Santa Clara, is absolutely necessary in Mordazo.

The Municipal Mayor and the Municipal Police of Santo Domingo, who are all Conservatives, are doing nothing in favor of our party, nor do they offer to campaign—the said mayor hindering them; and as said Municipal Government is in a bad state, it would suffice, in order to attain our object, to call said Mayor to order.

Pardon me for insisting upon the pardon of José de Jesus Fundora since it is for us in the district of Santo Domingo a real accomplishment to get pardoned the said Fundora, whom I propose to convey to Santo Domingo personally, as soon as you decide, which I hope will be shortly, as I have promised his family, friends, and fellow party members—who are many and of great importance in that district—to bring him soon.

Praying that you will not disregard the appeals I have made to you and always your unconditional friend

(signed) ADOLFO NUÑEZ.

The writer of this letter is one of the members of Congress from Santa Clara province and is likewise the political boss of the Conservative Party in the town of Santo Domingo. He writes to the President of the Republic to tell him that a violent campaign is being made in

Santo Domingo to defeat Tiburon, the "Shark," which is one of the nicknames of Gomez, the Liberal candidate for the presidency. However, he intimates that everything is not going as well as he could wish and he makes certain requests of the President. The first three of these requests concern the transfer of a captain, a sergeant, and a corporal of the Cuban army from one post to another.

In a country at peace, what political difference does it make at what posts any particular soldier happens to be located? Obviously where military intimidation is not contemplated it makes no difference. Where such intimidation is contemplated, it is important to have the right man in the right place. It took long and careful preparation to lay the ground for intimidation. The careful preparation was under the skillful command of Charles Hernandez. The Liberals have commonly credited Hernandez with the Conservative victory in 1916, asserting that, as Postmaster-General, he held up the mails while the election results were changed enough to give his party victory. He afterward became Minister of the Interior. In that capacity he controlled the secret police. Likewise he had the power to nullify the mayor and chief of police in any municipality in the island by appointing delegates usually known as military supervisors to administer his orders.

This power was given the Minister of the Interior so that in case of disorders getting beyond the control of the local authorities the central government could intervene. There are 112 municipalities in Cuba. On election day seventy-three were in the hands of supervisors although there had been no disturbance to justify this discontinuance of local control, and these seventy-three included practically all places where there were Liberal mayors or Liberal chiefs of police. The supervisors were drawn from the army. There was no difficulty in Secretary of the Interior Hernandez picking the officers and men he wanted, for he only had to deal with himself in another capacity. When the Minister of War obtained the necessary leave of absence to run for Congress, Hernandez was given the Department of War and Marine as well as the Interior Department. He was, therefore, in a good position to arrange the soldiery in such dispositions as suited the exigencies of the occasion. He could use the personnel of the army as supervisors under the Department of



THE "BEAR" OF THE ELECTION

Liborio (Cuba) talking to a military supervisor about a pardoned criminal who is acting as an electoral agent for the intimidation of the voter on the right

the Interior and on the pretence of maintaining order he could use the regular army for intimidation. The letter of Nuñez to President Menocal asking for the transfer of the captain, the sergeant, and the corporal, and the fact that these transfers were made as requested are some of the many evidences that the plan for intimidation was not only premeditated, but that it was premeditated by the administration.

But in spite of these careful arrangements, the task was not altogether easy because of the high character of some of the officers of the Cuban army. Most of the higher officers refused to do dirty political work and these were side-tracked to give the right of way to others who would. Only one of the nine heads of military districts, namely Colonel Amiel, of Matanzas, consented to do political propaganda. Numerous shifts among army officers were made before the proper immoral combination was secured. As Acting Secretary of War and Marine Hernandez side-tracked many honorable officers in the Cuban army and advanced into positions of power many others who were willing to soil their uniforms in political activities. With his previous experience in the post office and telegraph service, he was able to establish censorships over letters and telegrams, and to interfere with electoral returns and with the communications between leaders opposed to the party of the government.

The abuse of the military supervisors was

the particular development of the elections of 1920. Although these officials were invariably army men, they were serving on detached service. Essentially they took over the powers of the police and thereby deprived mayors and governors of power to enforce their orders in seventy-three out of 112 municipalities in Cuba. Many were men of low character and slight education, holding positions in the army as corporals and sergeants. Some were men of better calibre, but it was noticed that if a supervisor kept good order in his bailiwick and was impartial in his acts he was soon re-

moved. The most infamous of the military supervisors were Captain Luis Hernandez at Sagua la Grande, whose reign of terror resulted in several deaths, Major Arsenio Ortiz, at Santiago de Cuba, and Major Cordovés of Colon.

There is one other comment to be made upon the illuminating letter of Congressman Nuñez. In his third paragraph he said:

To transfer Sergeant Monteagudo to the post of Rodrigo in order to neutralize Troadio Perez, who has joined José Miguel.

Not only was the sergeant transferred to neutralize Troadio Perez, who had turned Liberal, but more direct methods were employed in an effort to neutralize him. Several attempts were made on his life. Whom they were made by and why can be judged from the following letter written by a sergeant in the army to Dr. Clemente Vasquez Bello, one of the Liberal leaders of Santa Clara province:

Rodrigo, October 7, 1920.

DR. CLEMENTE VASQUEZ BELLO,
Santa Clara.

Yesterday at about 5 p. m. three men, headed by Congressman Villavisencio, tried to murder my brother-in-law Troadio Perez, not succeeding in their attempt because one of his friends wounded one of the assassins with two shots. At about 11 p. m. Villavisencio arrived here from Santo Domingo with a party of eighty men, all armed, with the object of getting him out of the house by force and murdering him, not succeeding in their effort because they made

a mistake about the house he was supposed to be in, they returned to Santo Domingo. To-day at 10 A. M. Villavisencio returned with a party of ten or twenty policemen armed with rifles, with the object of carrying out their plan, but my brother-in-law had left the place. This town is in a state of complete alarm.

Another matter

Captain Luis Hernandez of Sagua sent to-day for all heads of barracks giving them instructions to the effect that the elections had to be won by all means, and that if it was necessary to kill they must kill, because the orders from M. had to be carried out. I understand that all the army has received the same instructions. All this I am telling you is absolutely true. I met to-day a brother of Troadio, because he is married to a sister-in-law of mine, and my eldest daughter is with her, and you can imagine the state of mind of this poor family.

I am always yours, your faithful fellow-Liberal,
(signed) JOSÉ PAULET,
Sergeant.

The Congressman Villavisencio is Congressman Adolfo Nuñez y Villavisencio, the author of the letter to President Menocal previously quoted.

So much for the arrangements made by the


Conservative administration for the use of the military power to influence the elections. I shall later give examples of how these arrangements worked out. In the meanwhile let us return to the last paragraph of Congressman Nuñez's own letter. It reads:


Pardon me for insisting upon the pardon of José de Jesus Fundora since it is for us in the district of Santo Domingo a real accomplishment to get pardoned the said Fundora, whom I propose to convey to Santo Domingo personally, as soon as you decide, which I hope will be shortly, as I have promised his family, friends, and fellow party members—who are many and of great importance in that district—to bring him soon.

It might not seem, superficially, that enough criminals could be pardoned to have any effect upon an election. However, in Cuba the ramification of the family ties are very powerful and the phrase of Nuñez's "his family, friends, and fellow party members who are of real importance" gives an indication of the results to be obtained by such pardons. This letter of Nuñez's was written on September 13th. On September 29th José de Jesus Fundora y Fundora was pardoned by President Menocal

INTIMIDATION

A Liberal view of the dangerous path of a Liberal voter on election day





THE EYES OF THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT

In the note of August 30th from our State Department it was stated that while the United States Government would not undertake to supervise the Cuban elections, it would use means to observe them

in Decree No. 351 published in the official gazette October 1st, over the refusal of the court to recommend the pardon. Fundora had served a little less than two and a half years of a sentence for fourteen years, eight months, and one day for murder.

A law of pardons, enacted in 1919, under the advisement of General Crowder, was designed to correct the abuse of pardoning criminals for political purposes. However, when the plans of the Conservatives for this election got under way, a last hour amendment to the law was passed, giving the President of the Republic special power to dispense with the limitations which General Crowder had devised, in cases when he obtained the previous consent of his Cabinet. Full publication in the official gazette of the details of the crime and the recommendations of the court of sentence are called for in this law, and the responsibility for any abuse in pardoning criminals lies fairly and unmistakably upon the President and his official family.

Between March 1, 1920, and October 6, 1920, no less than 335 pardons were granted by President Menocal, presumably with the consent of his Cabinet. Nearly all were for crimes outside the original intention of the law of pardons. A large number of these presidential decrees of leniency were extended to men guilty of crimes of blood and degeneracy without extenuating circumstances, and the pardons, in most circumstances, were made over the re-

fusal of the court of sentence to recommend them.

No less than forty-four murderers were turned loose upon society by President Menocal, who, as a cultured graduate of an American University, can hardly plead ignorance of the evil quality of his acts. The three black months were March, June, and September. It is not on record that the members of the Cabinet, whose consent was necessary, entered any protest when this virus was turned back into the veins of society. There were public protests against this pardoning programme, but they were not heeded. Month after month went by and this part of the preparation for a successful political campaign was consistently carried

on by the President of the Republic. In addition to the forty-four murderers, many other criminals were freed, some with long records, and guilty of such crimes as assault with intent to kill, rape, burglary, etc., as well as a raft of swindlers, gamblers, and petty thieves.

Some of the criminals were pardoned during the electoral period simply to obtain the goodwill and support of their friends and relatives, for the ramifications of family influence in Cuba are extensive in a way unknown in Anglo-Saxon countries. But there is evidence that many criminals were pardoned in 1920 by President Menocal and his Cabinet on the understanding that they should earn their freedom by acting as gunmen and bullies for the party of the government. So that the government had at its disposal the corrupt elements of the army, both as military supervisors and as soldiers, and likewise it had special agents, some of whom were pardoned criminals.

Besides the arrangements for intimidation of the Liberal vote by the use of the army, military supervisors and special agents, and the improper influencing of votes by granting political pardons, the Conservative administration injected another improper violent influence into the electoral period.

In the old days in Cuba the Negroes indulged in certain barbarous rites and dances. In Spanish colonial days efforts were made to stamp out these shameful dances called Congas

(after the Congo which was their home), the secret Ñañigo societies with their bloody feuds, and the superstitious cults of witchcraft and fetishism. The Ñañigo societies were organizations with a principal chief (Macombo), two lesser chiefs (Illamba and Isue), and a council of thirteen others. The rites of initiation included drinking the blood of a freshly killed cock, and there was, as well, a special beverage of blood and alcohol which was called *macuba*. During the American occupation under General Wood, and under the later American intervention, the meetings and public appearances of the Ñañigo societies were strictly prohibited and it was thought that the old fires had died. But they were only smouldering under the ashes.

When, therefore, President Menocal and his Cabinet, considered it necessary to pardon the head of one of these societies, a certain Marcos Barrios, *alias* Cayuco, who had served two years of a twenty years' term for the murder of Edward Muñoz, the leader of another society, a revival of the ancient feuds at once took place. The members of the Ecorio Efo and Ebion Efo potted each other in the streets while whirling by in automobiles. Cayuco's brother and several innocent bystanders were wounded, and the public morale was seriously affected.

The tumtum of the hollow log drums, beaten with the fingers, was the sign that a parade of the National League was coming. The drummers and the dancers of the Conga were nearly all from the dregs of Havana society, who at any other time than an election would not be permitted to dance their sensuous measures in the public streets. The result of reincarnating the Ñañigo feuds was to somewhat split the Negro vote which otherwise is chiefly Liberal.


With this brief picture of the preparations made by the "ins" (the Conservatives supporting Dr. Zayas on the League ticket) to continue in power and defeat the "outs" (the Liberals supporting General Gomez) we arrive at the day of election. I wish to reiterate, however, my earlier statement that neither party


is essentially better or worse in its political conduct than the other, but that the difference in their methods at any particular election depends almost entirely upon whether they are in, and have the governmental agencies in their hands, or whether they are out, and are forced to do without this power.

Election day was fair and there was a great outpouring of voters, especially in Santa Clara province, which is regarded as the crucial battle ground—it might well be considered so literally, for fourteen people were killed there. Having followed some of the preliminary arrangements suggested by Congressman Adolfo Nuñez y Villavisencio in the town of Santo Domingo, it is interesting to see how they worked out. In the six urban wards of the town there was no intimidation. The Liberals voted 89.7 per cent. of their enrolled strength which is a high percentage. But in the country wards (*barrios*) the course of events was different. In these country *barrios* under the encouragement of the congressman who rode around on horseback in the uniform of a captain in the Cuban army, the Conservatives voted 96.5 per cent. of their enrollment. Their opponents, the Liberals, voted just 10.7 per cent. of their enrollment. By the enrollment figures Santo Domingo is Liberal by a small majority. In the city wards that lead was increased by the actual voting. But in the country wards, where the congressman's efforts

SENDING THE NEWS TO UNCLE SAM

Over the dead body of Liborio, a liberal cartoon referring to the fact that the first reports of the election to the United States were to the effect that the election had been quiet and fair





A ÑAÑIGO ELECTION

Commenting on the revival of the Negro secret societies which had been suppressed for barbarism under previous American and Cuban administrations

were concentrated, about one in ten of the Liberals reached the polls and a total majority of 1,195 was rolled up for Dr. Zayas and the League. This was about half the League majority in the whole Province of Santa Clara. The transferring of the officers and the pardoning of Fundora bore the fruit intended.

Santo Domingo was a strategic point, but what was done there was also done in many other municipalities, and as in Santo Domingo it was usually in the country wards that the intimidation occurred. For instance, the college (voting place) in Guaracabulla in the municipality of Placetas was not allowed to open. That disposed of an indicated lead for Gomez of eighty-six votes. At Hernando seventeen Liberals out of 151 enrolled actually voted. At Nazareno only eight Liberals out of 108 voted. These three were rural wards. The extraordinary lack of interest in the voting of the Liberals in these wards is explained by the fact that bands of armed men rode around them all election day.

This was one method of reducing the Liberal

vote—armed bands riding through the country wards prevented the Liberal voters from going to the voting place. At other places the Liberals were driven away after they reached the polls. In Sagua la Grande, the soldiers, by order of their commanding officer, Sergeant Garcia, fired into a mass of Liberal voters. This order followed a shot which appears to have been a prearranged signal. Several persons were killed. This occurrence unquestionably had much to do with the Liberal vote being 74 per cent. of its enrollment while the Conservatives voted 96 per cent. of their enrollment. The Liberals presented 476 unused voting cards giving the names of those intimidated.

Some of the wards of Cienfuegos were very bad. There are a large number of men with criminal records regularly on the police force of that city and for the electoral period there were special importations of gunmen. In the ward of Arimao only nine Liberals out of 146 were allowed to vote. In Guaso, Captain Ovidio Ortega, a special aid to President Menocal, arrived on election eve with "a revolver

and \$100,000 to win the elections." He ordered the dispersal of Liberals before the polls without waiting for the hour of closing.

However, although armed intimidation was common, it did not usually take the form of preventing the Liberal voters from reaching the polls or by shooting at the Liberals once they had arrived. There was a more subtle and refined method of achieving the same ends. It was customary to line up the voters for Zayas and the League in one line and the voters for Gomez in another line, in order, it was explained, to prevent the fights that would occur if they mixed. With gunmen around, this segregation in itself was likely to give qualms to any weak-kneed Liberal. When the polls opened it was customary to take one man from one line and then one from the other. Nothing could be fairer! By this process as many Conservative votes could be had as Liberal ones, as long as the line held out; and if the polls closed about the time that the last Conservative voted, it is evident that any surplus of Liberals would lose their votes. It is surprising how many polls were closed with part of the Liberal voters, outside with their ballots still uncast, especially as the Conservative majorities were never caught this way.

For example: The polls at Salamanca, in Camajuani, were located in the school house of Central Fé, an American-owned sugar mill, and the operations were under the observation of several Americans. This college opened at 7:35 A. M. There was a crowd of waiting voters before the door at all times and the record was as follows:

By 9:35 A. M. 59 persons had voted.

By 11:35 A. M. 137 persons had voted.

By 1:35 P. M. 189 persons had voted.

By 3:05 P. M. 214 persons had voted.

This means a little less than thirty persons an hour in a completely equipped college with eight booths. The interesting fact is that of the eighty odd voters left at the gate, all were Liberals.

There was a general policy of delay in most places where the "outs" had an indicated plural-

ity. In Caibarién hundreds of Liberals lost their votes through a policy of malicious delay. I remember talking with Pedro Revuelta, the hustling agent of Swift and Company, who, as president of an electoral table on election day, managed to pass in all the League voters and enough Liberals to give the latter a majority of fifty-seven when the ballots were counted; but a hundred more Liberals were turned away at 3 P. M. At this place the voting constantly had to be held up to give the proper count when each candidate called at the two hour interval, which under the local reading of the law he had a right to do. In this town the Liberals in an effort to ward off 3 P. M. and the closing of the polls, turned back the town clock but their trick was in vain.

It is fair to ask what the election officers were doing while these things were going on. It does not appear that they were in general a part of the conspiracy. They were of as high a standard of honesty and intelligence as could be expected, for their positions were not sought after. The intimidations that had prevailed in some of the rural districts and the fear that the officers would be specially exposed, made the positions of president and secretary of an electoral college extremely unpopular. Especially was this true where city dwellers were informed that they must ride on horseback for several hours to some outlying ward that was unknown to them and which might be raided at any time. As a result of the Hernandez

ZAYAS ABOUT TO STICK CUBA WITH PAPER MONEY

Zayas proposed to give power to a Cuban bank to issue Cuban paper currency. At present American currency is in use




campaign of nullifying mayors and chiefs of police by military supervisors, there was not a Liberal administration functioning in any municipality on election day. With this fact in mind, when a Liberal election officer began his duties and noticed that armed soldiers, police, and special agents stood at the very doors of the college, discretion was apt

to overcome his desire to see that all was fair in the conduct of the elections. Under the ruling of the Central Electoral Board all soldiers were to be in their barracks on election day, except such as were specifically indicated. Two soldiers were assigned to each college to keep order, but these two were not to approach closer than twenty-five meters except upon the request of the election officers. Similarly there were guards for the municipal electoral boards and the provincial boards. But this order was generally violated, especially in the rural districts where most of the intimidation occurred.

Numberless instances of the way in which these organized illegalities worked to prevent a fair election can be given. Proofs can also be submitted from other provinces, but new instances can add nothing to the 100 per cent. fact that the administration did its best to prevent a fair election. Moreover, it succeeded although by only a small majority. In Santa Clara province the League candidate, Doctor Zayas, had a majority of 2,325 out of a total vote of 86,411. In the six provinces of Cuba the majority of the League was 10,585 out of a total vote of 312,765. Only one province went officially Liberal, yet it is likely that the Liberals carried all with the possible exception of Oriente.

However, a majority is a majority. The Liberals feel that they have been defrauded of an election and the facts strongly bear out their



THE COMPLAINTS TO MINISTER LONG

A conservative cartoon showing a Liberal, heavily armed, complaining to American Minister Long and getting little sympathy

contention. They feel also that they were defrauded four years ago. With these convictions there is little for them to look forward to in any future election. Four years ago they tried revolution—which failed. But it has succeeded before and might again. In the meanwhile Liberal leaders are beseeching Washington to intervene and put the

government into their hands.

Theoretically there is another remedy for correcting an election that has been fraudulent, besides revolution or American intervention—due process of law. But the Cuban people are not convinced of its effectiveness. Their recent experiences give some explanation of this.

The revolution of 1917 began four months and ten days after the election and was made necessary, according to Cuban psychology, by the failure of the courts to give effective correction. In view of the tremendous amount of fraudulent voting on both sides during that election, it must be admitted that the courts had a large job before them. The registers in 1916 contained well over a million names and about 800,000 votes were cast, according to the official counts. Yet when the new census was taken in 1919, less than 500,000 qualified voters were found in all Cuba. The fraud was on both sides, and the courts were given the problem of arriving at the real truth, stripped of all fictions and devices.

Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of Cuba, after many long delays, did issue a series of decrees in favor of the Liberals, and ordered twenty or more mayors who had been candidates of this party, to be seated. Some of these decisions were rendered in February, 1920, when the original terms of office had less than a year to run. But these mayors, seated by the Supreme Court of Cuba, were not allowed to keep possession. They were

immediately suspended by the governors and another legal recourse set in motion.

Open defiance of the Supreme Court of Cuba was seen during the recent election in the case of Miguel Albarran, a Conservative, who became acting mayor of Havana through a most flagrant violation of the electoral law. A decision against him was rendered by the Central Electoral Board and confirmed by the Supreme Court. Yet Señor Albarran was kept in office over the highly important period of the elections and for a month thereafter, until the time when newly chosen mayors were scheduled to take office. It was stated that Dr. Ricardo Lancis, the Fiscal of the Supreme Court (corresponding roughly to our Attorney-General) refused to proceed in this and other open violations of the law in electoral matters.

Still another interesting light on the lack of real and effective independence of the judicial branch is seen in the failure to prosecute army men for crimes of intimidation and worse. The point was made that these men could not be tried in the civil courts but only in military courts, because Cuba had not made peace with all the Central Powers. The Supreme Court rendered a plain decision on this point on October 7, 1920, stating that Cuba had made peace with all nations with which she was at war, and it subsequently made a number of other decisions of the same tenor, but the executive continued to protest.

It was seen that the decision was far-reaching since it took away from President Menocal the special war powers under which he had decreed the general moratorium.

The Supreme Court of Cuba is doubtless composed of fearless and honorable men, but it appears fatuous to trust in mere forms of law when

evil forces are abroad. I have spoken with eminent lawyers of both Liberal and Conservative faith and all agree that the hope of legal correction for the electoral evils is a vain one. The courts are swamped, witnesses are subject to intimidation, and practical politicians in back rooms settle cases themselves. Even if General Crowder succeeds in making the courts function temporarily, what will happen when he leaves?

Again we get back to the main facts. The success of the system of government which we gave Cuba is based upon the ability to hold a fair election and to abide by its results. It cannot live either, unless the courts are able to guarantee justice in political as well as personal or property matters.

Recent events add to the accumulated evidence that Cuba cannot hold a fair election, that its courts cannot enforce their decrees in political matters, and that the method of changing parties by revolution instead of by election threatens to continue as the only way to uproot a predatory régime.


THE ELECTION RECORD IN CUBA

A REHEARSAL of the record will make this plainer. In 1902 General Wood turned over the government of Cuba to President Palma after a fair election held under American auspices. The next election produced a revolution and American intervention.

In 1908 an election was held under American control. The next election, 1912, was successfully carried out by Cuba without intervention or revolution. The election of 1916, however, was followed by a revolution which failed and by a modified form of intervention when General Crowder was

HANGING SOMETHING ON GENERAL CROWDER

A cartoon in which Liborio, the Uncle Sam of Cuba, is looking at General Crowder, who is reading the "Electoral Bible," the law in which he endeavored to prevent combination of parties but which the conservatives amended so as to form the League. The tail on General Crowder is Zayas the candidate of the League



invited by the Cuban Government to revise their election laws so as to prevent fraud. But in spite of this law as we see, the fraud continues and revolution or intervention, or both, threaten as a consequence of the election of 1920.

What is the cure and who is the physician for the malady that has fallen upon Cuba? It is understood that in the Treaty of Paris, signed December 10, 1898, the United States guaranteed to Spain and to the society of nations, the maintenance in Cuba of a permanent and responsible government. The decision to give the Cuban people their independence did not relieve the United States of their international obligation, and as a result, the famous Platt Amendment was appended to the Constitution of the Republic of Cuba, after the acceptance by the Constitutional Convention on June 12, 1901, and the essential points of this amendment were inserted in a permanent treaty between Cuba and the United States. In Article 3 of this amendment the Government of Cuba consented that the United States might exercise the right to interfere for the preservation of independence, for the sustainment of a government adequate to the protection of life, property, and individual liberty, and the fulfillment of the obligations imposed upon the United States by the Treaty of Paris. Effectively, the United States is in duty bound to interfere in the affairs of Cuba when there is a grave alteration in public order, health, or political morality affecting the rights of the world at large or fundamentally endangering the real liberties and well-being of the Cuban people.

There has already been an extended military intervention and there have been a considerable number of diplomatic interventions—if such a term may be employed. An example of the latter was the drafting of the new electoral law and the holding of the new census under the advisement of Gen. E. H. Crowder. This was a result of the unsatisfactory elections of 1916 and the subsequent revolution of 1917. But, it will appear from the record, that the government, as well as the press and public opinion of the United States, has been jealous not to impair the actual independence of Cuba, but instead to extend help and advice merely as a friend. It is not too much to say that the people of the United States have rejoiced at the material and intellectual advances made by the people of Cuba, and have

tried to further the habit of self reliance and the upbuilding of national pride based upon worthy achievement.

But it is a condition in Cuba and not the state of our own mind that confronts us. What are we going to do to fulfill our obligations to Cuba, to ourselves, and to the world in general?

Moreover, what we do will not affect Cuba alone. The fact that we gave Cuba her independence has been one of the chief arguments not only for the independence of the Philippines but also for more independence for all peoples held in government tutelage, such as the people of India, of Egypt, and of many other countries. Have we done better by Cuba or by Porto Rico?

If we are to make Cuba an example, it must be a good example of independence. If it is not a good example, we cannot continue to use it as a precedent.

We have tried to give Cuba a form of government that we regard as successful among ourselves—or successful with that eternal vigilance which is the price of liberty. We naïvely think of the problems of Cuba in terms of our own life and national psychology, forgetting that these take very different forms in a Latin-American community.

The racial make-up of the Cuban population is Southern European and African. There is an impression among many persons that the proportion of Negroes in Cuba is much larger than it really is.

THE SOCIAL MAKE-UP OF CUBA

IN THE old slave days, between 1817 and 1861, the Negroes amounted to from 55 to 58 per cent. of the total population. But slavery came to an end in 1878 and the proportion of Negroes, mulattoes, etc. has been falling off markedly since that time. According to the recent Cuban census there were 2,088,047 whites and 800,957 colored persons, the latter number including about 11,000 Orientals. There are still several thousand Negroes who give Africa as their birthplace. The attitude of persons of white blood is much more tolerant toward the Negroes in Cuba than in our own Southern states and no suggestion is made of excluding them from the suffrage. The proportion of Negro soldiers in the Cuban armies of independence was high and the national hero, Maceo, was a black man.

But the culture of Cuba is that of Spain,

and the social organization developed under an acceptance of the idea of aristocracy and of the ramified family.

Our small families make possible a direct division of opinion on public questions at an election, because the family element is too weak to be coercive. But Latin-American families go to the polls in phalanxes. Moreover, there is still a very real power of leadership in certain well-established families whose will comes pretty close to being law. A result of the extended family type of social organization is found in the weakness of ideas of the "commonwealth." The Cuban individual recognizes a loyalty to his distant relatives that for practical purposes is greater than his loyalty to the state. He will gladly die for his country, but he insists on living for his family. Of course this type of social organization has its own philosophy of government—namely, that of a royal family.

It is quite possible that with education this Old World society will disappear in a truly New World democracy. Until it does, however, it is not fair to the Cuban people to bring a general indictment of misgovernment against them. But at least they have not been able to keep up the government we gave them.


The prime necessities of life are often covered up in an empty symbolism of terms. In practice, "freedom" is based on a sense of things that must not be done; on inhibitions which prevent individuals from weakening the popular will and from intruding on the rights of their fellows. Cuba needs schools and more schools. She needs roads and wharves and other developments of the commonwealth. The present economic arrangements are so bad that only a country of great excess wealth could stand the drain. Sanitation is threatened by political chaos. Shall we "Americanize" Cuba till our Government works among them, or shall we permit them to find their own salvation in the form of strong men by the old process of revolution?

Since the World War, American public opinion is more than ever opposed to any military intervention. After the discussions of self-determination as an American principle at the peace table, Americans would particularly like to escape from exercising any control in Cuba. Since a free and independent Cuba

has been one of the chief arguments of our disinterestedness in our relations with Latin-America any form of intervention is unwelcome. Moreover, Cuba as a self-governing country on a successful basis has been one of our proudest achievements on which we have delighted to dwell in speech and writing. A State Department that recognized the facts in Cuba to-day and acted upon our responsibilities under the Platt Amendment would have to go counter to an enormous popular prejudice. This pride and prejudice would be much more difficult to overcome than the actual conditions in Cuba.

If some form of intervention is necessary it is not necessarily a military intervention. One such man as General Wood whose reputation is to-day higher in Cuba as a fair and successful administrator than any other man, American or Cuban, could go as Governor-General, and with practically no other Americans in office make the Government of Cuba work as it did under his administration before.

It is ten years since a treasurer's report on government expenditures has been given the light in Cuba. If money is not the root of all evil it is certainly at the bottom of most political evils. Out of the present adversity a great advantage might come to Cuba with a fuller use of scientific budgets and audits. According to the theory of republican government taxes are justifiable because they make possible utilities and facilities that constitute a commonwealth. Public expenditures should pay for themselves many times over in the general advantages which individuals would otherwise have to create for themselves. The annual income of Cuba is greater to-day than the total sum of money expended by General Wood in his monumental improvements. If intervention should take no more stringent form than the acceptance by the Cuban Government of a commission of high-minded American citizens who in advisory capacity should oversee expenditures and be responsible before the public opinion of the world for good sanitation, good banking regulation, good transportation and port facilities, and, most of all, good schools in Cuba, the gain would be immediate and tremendous. Evil things curl up and die under the clear light of publicity.



COUNT WITTE'S MEMOIRS

MY VISIT TO AMERICA AND THE PORTSMOUTH PEACE CONFERENCE

My First Wireless Interview in Mid-Ocean. My Talks with President Roosevelt. Impressions of American Customs. The Diplomatic Duel with Komura, Resulting in a Peace Advantageous to Russia

By COUNT SERGIUS WITTE

Minister of Finance and Premier of Russia under Czar Nicholas II

Translated from the Original Russian and Edited by Abraham Yarmolinsky, Curator of the Slavonic Division of the New York Public Library

IN JULY, 1905, I was appointed chief plenipotentiary for the purpose of conducting peace negotiations with Japan. The next day I had a short audience with His Majesty, in the course of which he thanked me for having accepted the appointment and said it was his sincere desire that the *pourparlers* should result in peace. He added, however, that he would not pay a coepek of indemnity or cede an inch of Russian territory.

Several days later I set out for the United States of America. It was arranged that part of my retinue should meet me at Cherbourg, where I was to embark, and that the rest should join me in New York. I left St. Petersburg accompanied by my wife with our several-months-old grandson, Leo Naryshkin, and a body of servants. We stopped in Paris, where I spent several days. In the French capital my feelings as a Russian patriot were hurt at every step. The public treated me, the chief plenipotentiary of the Autocrat of all the Russias, as a representative of some political nonentity. Some—a slight minority—sym-

pathized with me, others did not conceal their joy at our misfortune; but the majority treated me with complete indifference. At the station in Paris cries of *Faites la paix* were heard. The attitude of the radical press toward the Emperor and our country was insulting.

I left Paris for Cherbourg accompanied by my wife, our daughter, and her husband, Naryshkin, and also a host of journalists. I had intended to go aboard our steamer in the evening, but the ship was delayed by a storm and I did not embark until the next morning. We spent the night at a hotel, which was so crowded that we could barely secure two uncomfortable rooms. At Cherbourg the disdainful attitude of the French toward us was even more marked. It may well be, however, that, in my delicate rôle as representative of a country which had by chance become entangled in an unfortunate position, I was inclined to be morbidly sensitive and suffer from imaginary affronts and animosities.

The steamer on which we were to make our passage was, if I remember rightly, the *Wilhelm der Grosse* of the Hamburg-American Line,

PATRIMONIO
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OFICINA DEL HISTORIADOR
DE LA HABANA